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Abstract  
The European Investment Bank (EIB), the primary financial arm of the European 
Union (EU) has become of central interest in the last ten years. The EIB has been 
increasingly solicited by the EU to bolster the European economy during the global 
crisis and support its recovery thereafter. Calls have recently been voiced for the EIB 
to contribute to the European Green Deal and the post-pandemic economic stimulus. 
This paper studies the EIB’s role in the European economy through its business 
model in the period from 2009–2019. The paper’s prime objective is to investigate 
what enabled the EIB to act in a countercyclical mode and how the EIB met the new 
economy needs in this turbulent environment.    
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Introduction 
The European Investment Bank (EIB), the primary financial arm of the European 
Union (EU) took centre stage following the economic crisis in 2008. In the ten-year 
period of 2009–2019, the EIB has been called upon to act in a countercyclical mode by 
increasing its lending amid the economic crisis and subsequently promote the EU’s 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. More recently, the EIB has been solicited to 
bolster the EU’s Green Deal announced in late 2019 and redress the consequences of 
the pandemic in 2020.  
In this context, academic interest in the EIB has recently increased, although it does 
not match the bank’s economic and political clout. Academic literature focuses mainly 
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on the EIB's financing activity (Liebe & Howarth 2019; Clifton et al., 2018; Anghel et al. 
2016; Clifton et al. 2014; Pistoia 2014; Marzinotto 2011; Fedele et al. 2010). This paper 
aims to complement existing scholarly work by examining the EIB as an organisation 
in the last ten years. It will address the following questions: What enabled the EIB to 
act in a countercyclical mode? What enabled the EIB to meet the new needs in this 
turbulent environment? 
Following a Popperian approach, this paper studies the EIB as an organisation for a 
period in which its policies and practices constitute trial solutions to prevailing 
economic and social problems. To answer the research questions, the paper 
examines the EIB’s business model. An organisation’s business model describes how 
it creates and delivers value, providing a unique vantage point from which to observe 
the organisation (Calvante et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2008; Osterwalder 2004; Zott et 
al. 2011). A business model contains strategy and activity parameters, and it unveils a 
business’s structure and processes, so it can be used to plan an organisation’s future 
but also to study its past and present. Although the EIB’s officials have made frequent 
reference to its business model, these have been short verbal descriptions connected 
with the bank’s triple-A credit rating (EIB 2010; Szymczak 2010; EIB 2011; Camdessus, 
M. 2010, p. 19). Given the implicit link with EIB’s rating, the bank’s recent references 
have been diversified, coining the name “EIB’s financial model” (EIB 2019b, p. 18). The 
EIB's business model has never been available in the public domain. Nevertheless, 
this paper presents the EIB’s business model, crafted based on a hybrid archetype 
devised by the author to match the bank’s dual nature as an EU body and a bank. 
Based on an existing archetypal model (Johnson et al. 2008) and reflecting the affinity 
diagram of business models’ components (Schafer et al. 2005), this hybrid model 
consists of four primary interlocking elements that reflect the institutional side and 
the banking side of the EIB: a) strategic choices, which describe the core logic; b) value 
capture, which refers to the capabilities and competencies that secure the resources 
needed for the organisation’s viability; c) value creation, which concerns how the 
organisation delivers its value proposition to the client; and d) value network, which 
pertains to the internal and external support web of staff, stakeholders, peers, and 
suppliers. The EIB’s institutional side consists primarily of its strategic choices and, to 
a lesser extent, its value network, whereas the value creation and value capture 
elements reflect the EIB’s banking side. This generic hybrid model has been tailored 
to the EIB by filling in its elements with the EIB's business fundamentals. As an EU 
body, the EIB’s fundamentals are contained in the bank’s statute (EIB 1999; OJEU 
2016) and are in the public domain, as they form an integral part of the EU’s treaties 
(Edward & Lane 2013).  
The review of the EIB’s statutes overtime reveals that only two of them resulted in 
business model revisions (Kavvadia 2018). These revisions, which took place in 1999 
and 2010, were driven to a great extent by a mixture of European policy and market 
developments, reflecting the introduction of the Euro and the difficult economic 
environment in the EU before and during the global economic crisis. The November 
2019 announcement of the EIB’s pivot to become the first international climate bank 
and its statutory modification following the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU 
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in March 2020 are beyond the scope of the present analysis. This paper focuses on 
the EIB’s 2010 model, which was applied until the end of the ten-year period under 
review. Benchmarking the model by the EIB’s annual performance, the analysis shows 
that the model is well conceived and has proven robust and flexible, allowing for the 
bank’s inorganic and organic growth. Inorganic growth means growth originating 
from external political calls for activity, which the EIB has fulfilled, acting as a policy-
taker. Organic growth refers to the EIB’s augmented activity resulting from the 
extension of its normal business and to cases when the EIB acts as a policy-maker 
(Mertens & Thiemann 2019) or policy entrepreneur (Liebe & Howarth 2019), 
promoting policies and products that suit its operational plans. The bank was 
consequently able not only to fulfil its remit in support of European policies but also 
to boost its own organisational objectives.  
This paper adds to existing work and contributes to scientific research by studying the 
EIB to improve understanding of its function as an organisation.  
The paper is organised as follows: the next section presents the EIB’s business model 
for the ten-year period of concern, analyses the model and attempts to explain how it 
bolstered the bank’s activity over this turbulent period. The conclusion briefly 
summarises the paper’s major findings.  
Mastering the turbulent crisis environment: An “all-weather” business model?  
The business model under study has been in force since 2010, coinciding with the 
spread of the economic crisis in the EU. It was crafted, however, based on previous 
deliberations at the EU’s and EIB’s top levels. This model is a consolidation and 
extension of the EIB’s 1999 model—the model’s first revision since the bank’s 
establishment in 1957—which is presented in Figure 1, with the relevant changes to 
the 2010 model underlined in the diagram in Figure 2. These changes were 
introduced gradually, reflecting Lindblom’s incrementalism (Lindblom 1959). 
Characterised by a remarkable flexibility in interpreting European policy-makers’ 
objectives, the EIB’s 1999 business model enabled the bank to develop from mono-
focus activity, such as regional development and, later, market-making or investment 
promotion (Clifton et al. 2014, 2018), to multi-foci activity for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. The 1999 revision of the business model was deemed necessary 
because of the cataclysmic changes leading up to the Euro’s introduction concerning 
both investment supply and demand under the prevailing financial conditions. The 
enlarged, liquid single-Euro capital markets bred fierce competition among issuers in 
terms of interest rates. On the demand side, the Maastricht criteria restricted public 
financing of investments and curtailed lending demand. Against this backdrop and 
amid a reshaping of economic governance, the EIB had to remain useful to the EU, 
which was seeking growth against all odds. The EIB faced some challenges: i) high 
lending volumes to publicly financed infrastructure projects could no longer be 
expected, and ii) a turn to increased private lending was challenging, as EIB’s fine 
interest rates were no longer attractive to private borrowers, who could tap the vast, 
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liquid Euro capital markets, while the single currency dissipated the EIB’s ability to 
lower rates through arbitrage.  
The global economic crisis created a different situation. On the supply side, existing 
liquidity sought good investment prospects in capital markets, and EIB’s triple-A was 
exceptionally attractive amid several sovereign downgrades. On the demand side, 
however, investment plans were arrested, as public finance was devastated by the 
sovereign debt crisis and private finance was put on hold due to prevailing 
uncertainties and consumption collapse. The EIB’s 2010 business model revision 
therefore aimed predominantly to redress demand difficulties. EU policy decisions, 
partly stemming also from the EIB’s activism (Liebe & Howarth 2019), resulted in 
change to the EIB’s strategic choices, which triggered concomitant modifications in all 
four elements of its business model. However, this study’s analysis shows that these 
changes were carried out primarily in the value capture and the value network 
elements of the bank’s business model.  
To address private sector needs, the EIB’s offering remained focused on lending but 
pivoted to increased leverage, achieving higher investments with the same amount of 
funding through so-called special activities. These special activities included risk 
capital and equity participation and structured finance. To increase its leverage—in 
other words, to obtain a higher multiplier for its lending and hence a greater impact 
on new investment creation through these special activities—the EIB focused on: i) 
blending its own funds with EU Commission resources; ii) upgrading the role of the 
European Investment Fund (EIF), the EIB's subsidiary, by distinguishing more clearly 
between venture-capital funding and lending, respectively, aiming to increase intra-
group coherence, complementarity and efficiency; iii) developing new financial roles, 
such as bond purchaser and underwriter; and iv) institutionalising its long-claimed 
catalyst role, by monetizing  its human resources by providing advisory services.  
Paired mainly with the European Commission, the EIB’s advisory services were 
offered through the Joint Initiatives and, later, the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) as part of the “Juncker Plan.” These advisory services also extended 
its public–private partnerships (PPPs) expertise into a further consulting area (Liebe & 
Howarth 2019). The EIB’s activism in this area had already begun under its 1999 
business model, resulting in the creation of the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) 
in 2008. EPEC was further developed under the bank's 2010 model as a way to 
continue the EIB’s funding of infrastructure projects despite the public sector retreat. 
Building on its value network and its strength as a catalyst for large infrastructure 
financing, the EIB recently described itself as a “crowding-in bank” (EIB 2019b, p. 12). 
This term implies that the EIB’s due-diligence process provides a quality shield to 
projects, paving the way for commercial banks and other investors to crowd-in. Unlike 
commercial banks, the EIB's project appraisals go beyond financial risk to include 
market, economic, environmental and technological risks.  
In its catalyst role, the EIB also cultivates synergies with other financiers. Since 1999, 
the EIB has sought to cooperate with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), 
as shown by the increasing number of agreements in the form of Memoranda of 
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Understanding. These memoranda have resulted in mutual benefits including i) 
enrichment of their client base and project pipelines by cross-sharing projects; ii) 
denting operating costs by sharing project appraisal tasks; iii) paring down project 
and borrower/guarantor risks through risk-sharing, resulting in improved asset 
quality; and iv) affirmation of their relevance by demonstrating an efficient use of 
public funding through cooperation.  
The EIB also scaled up its partnership with commercial banks and national 
promotional agencies (NPAs). The EIB has striven to cooperate with national banking 
systems since its establishment. Even if it filled market failures, supra-national public 
funding could not be easily justified if it competed with commercial banks, which are 
valuable national interests. This is especially the case because organisations seek 
parallel market opportunities when filling market failures.  
As the Bank pointed out in its first Annual Report in 1958, by creating not another 
fund, but a bank, the six member states: set aside more direct financial intervention 
methods which no doubt would not in the long run have enabled adequate resources 
to be raised. They particularly wished the promotion of investments . . . to be carried 
out by existing banking houses . . . That is, they wished to utilise the commercial 
world banking system, with the EIB providing ‘an additional source of financing which 
might prove decisive’ in creating or furthering projects they wanted realised. 
(Lewenhak 1982, p. 23)  
Since its conception, the EIB has been a complementary source of finance with its 
funding limited to a maximum of 50%, or in exceptional cases 75%, of the total 
project cost, allowing other financiers to take part in its deals. Cooperation with the 
banking network has always been a project purveying channel for the EIB, especially 
for reaching small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which historically represent 
about 30% of EIB annual lending, and other direct or indirect loans, mainly with a 
commercial bank as the intermediary borrower. The EIB’s cooperation with the 
banking system not only increases the lending activity of all actors but also mitigates 
their risks through aggregation and sharing. The EIB also cooperates with commercial 
banks in guarantee operations, guaranteeing their loans or vice versa, which 
historically represents about 30% of all EIB guarantees. The banking sector, an 
important partner of the EIB on its borrowing side, has benefited from commissions 
and fees on the EIB’s vast emission programmes while often using the EIB’s SMEs 
financing lines—known as global loans—as treasury funding. The EIB’s partnership 
with commercial banks has enabled it to function for about 40 years with no active 
client solicitation in its business model until 1999. Customer and investor relations 
were further strengthened in the 2010 model through an increased number of direct 
contacts in the form of road shows, fora, national and regional conferences, global 
relations management (GRM) and a new worldwide office network , which includes 
about 50 regional offices from all continents in the last 10 years.     
The objectives added to the EIB’s 1999 model, such as human capital and innovation, 
allowed the bank to refocus from a limited number of specific policy foci, notably 
regional development and market-making activities (Clifton et al. 2014), to multiple 
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foci, covering “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”. These objectives were 
applied flexibly to match the ever-evolving European requirements, in support of the 
Lisbon Agenda in 2000, the European Action for Growth in 2003 and the Europe 2020 
Initiative in 2009, which led to the EIB’s consequent endorsement by successive EU 
Councils. Despite its success, the EIB’s 1999 business model had to be revised within 
ten years to adapt to the pre-crisis and global crisis context characterised by sluggish 
investment despite abundant liquidity. The EIB's 2010 model aimed to channel 
inactive liquidity into investments by enabling the EIB to carry higher risks, thereby 
further increasing the bank's competitiveness and relevance. The 2010 model went 
well beyond a quantitative increase of EIB lending volumes, which would have had 
unspectacular results, considering the EIB’s lending from 2010–2017 represented only 
2.5% of the EU’s GDP and 10% of the EU’s gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) . The 
model’s revisions therefore targeted the qualitative turn of EIB lending, prioritising 
new areas for promoting smart and inclusive growth, such as human capital and 
innovation. By their nature, however, investments in these areas bear greater risks 
and require adapted finance products. The increased risk-taking and risk-sharing 
products the EIB had started to test and implement under its 1999 business model 
came to the fore to be further developed, strengthened and complemented with new 
ones to achieve increased leverage. Unlike several of its peer MDBs, the EIB’s 
resultant scaled-up risk appetite and leverage carried low intrinsic risk, allowing the 
bank to maintain its top-notch triple-A rating. The EIB’s low intrinsic risk is due to the 
value capture element of its business model, which has demonstrated several key 
strengths that characterise the EIB and differentiate it from its peers: a) strong 
shareholders’ support, as evidenced by successive capital increases  and the resulting 
metrics (EIB 2017; EIB 2016); b) strained yet satisfactory capital adequacy, thanks to 
its strong asset quality ; c) low-risk operating environment, as the EIB has provided 
about 90% of the lending in the EU’s highly developed shareholder countries ; d) 
diversified loan portfolio in terms of geographical, sectoral and counterparty-type; e) 
adequate liquidity with a twelve-month buffer, strengthened further by the bank’s 
access to the European Central Bank (ECB)’s liquidity facilities, which is almost unique 
among peer MDBs ; f) prudent risk management enhanced by the EIB's preferred 
creditor status (PCS) (EIB,2016), which is also rare among peer MDBs ; g) high asset 
quality, due to the high-quality borrowers who approach the EIB and the bank’s due-
diligence and guarantee requirements; h) externalisation of operations bearing the 
highest risk to the EU or member states—a unique feature among its peers, giving the 
EIB an advantage over other MDBs (Kavvadia, 2020)—which means it enjoys 
guarantees for its portfolio outside the EU and within the EU for high-risk projects. 
The EIB's qualitative turn to new areas of priority was supplemented by a further 
improvement to its business model in 2010. This model institutionalised the blending 
of EU grants with EIB loans for better, more efficient and effective coordination of 
European funding for investment projects. The EIB has always cooperated and 
coordinated with the Commission, its sister institution, in terms of policy, financial 
support of European priority areas and EU funding channelled through the EIB under 
the mandate of prime policy areas. Examples within the EU include the New 
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Community Instrument (NIC), topical natural catastrophe interventions and, more 
recently, the EFSI and most EIB operations outside the EU. This EIB feature  of 
cooperating with the Commission is unique among MDBs and has been further 
extended in the bank’s 2010 model to blend EIB resources at market rates with the 
Commission’s grants under the Structural Funds, resulting in reduced aggregate 
funding costs. Cost reductions being paid upfront, the cost reductions that are 
achieved through injecting grants into projects' finance plans have better effects on 
investments than interest-rate subsidies; these cost reductions provide front-loaded 
relief during the initial phases of a project’s realisation, when start-up costs are high 
and cash flow rarely reaches target levels, while their present net value is higher. With 
such cost reductions, EIB’s lending terms became even more competitive. These cost 
reductions were attractive to project promoters, allowing the EIB to maintain its 
market share amid the fierce competition of the Euro euphoria period, and they 
enabled the EIB's countercyclical intervention during the crisis years.  
Beyond the funding blend, the closer cooperation between the EIB and the 
Commission was also institutionalised through a number of Joint Initiatives  
concerning SMEs, urban renewal and technical assistance to infrastructure projects. 
These initiatives benefited the EIB by enlarging its customer base, reaching 530 new 
advisory assignments in 2018 (EIB, 2019c:3), while increasing its income from advisory 
services fees . The Joint Initiatives also enriched the Commission’s technical skills. 
Additionally, the qualitative improvements foreseen in the 2010 model triggered 
concrete benefits for the European investment scene by i) buffeting the EIB's 
multiplier effect for more impactful lending; ii) scaling up investment through cross-
sharing projects among MDBs; and iii) developing new investment proposals through 
advisory services, which assisted in the design and setup of bankable projects. 
Furthermore, these three qualitative improvements constituted the springboard for 
EIB's increased activity in support of the EU's counter-crisis efforts for recovery and 
growth. The EIB's contribution to these EU efforts has not been limited to its normal 
activity. It has received an additional and considerable thrust through the EFSI, which 
was created in the framework of the Juncker Investment Plan in 2015. Beyond higher 
lending volumes, the EFSI focused on changing the qualitative profile of projects to be 
financed through increased risk-taking, “eyeing” in particular projects in “strategic 
infrastructure, education, RDI, renewable energy and resource efficiency, as well as 
support for SMEs and Midcaps” (EIB 2016, p. 1). Carrying a higher-than-average credit 
risk embedded in the EIB’s portfolio , loans under the EFSI benefit from the EU 
guarantee representing 25% of the total (for bolstering the EIB’s value creation 
element) while EFSI equity and mezzanine instruments were also guaranteed by the 
EU.  
This type of EIB activity, with part of the risk exported to the EU, will continue because 
the bank is also expected to play an important role in InvestEU (EIB,2019a), the 
Juncker Plan’s successor. InvestEU will be based on a 38 billion EUR guarantee from 
the EU budget, with the aim of mobilising 650 billion EUR of investment to allow the 
EU to remain “social, green and competitive”  (EIB, 2019a). Entrusting the 
implementation of the Juncker Plan and its forthcoming successor InvestEU to the EIB 
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confirmed anew the bank's European mandate, which constitutes an integral part of 
the bank’s future development, as mentioned by its president: “InvestEU, from our 
perspective—from the perspective of investment and growth—is about transforming 
EFSI into a long-term, robust and financially sustainable tool to support EU policy 
delivery, notably in those key areas of innovation, climate and cohesion that I 
mentioned a minute ago” (EIB 2019b, p. 11). Nevertheless, InvestEU dethrones the EIB 
from its privileged and long-held position as the sole counterparty of the EU’s major 
financing initiatives, which places the bank at par with other financial organisations, 
such as the National Promotional Banks (NPBs). Still, by guaranteeing project risks, 
InvestEU will allow the bank to continue playing an important role—albeit smaller, 
entrusting the EIB with only 75% of the funds—in economic sectors of prime 
European importance, such as innovation and climate enhancement. However, 
InvestEU is intended to demonstrate higher efficiency and effectiveness than the 
Juncker Plan by introducing competition among the financial actors, including the EIB 
and NPBs, while spreading risk more widely among EIB and NPBs. InvestEU has 
therefore been conceived with a higher multiplier of 17 than that of the original 
EFSIat 15. Through higher leveraging, EU funding is expected to have an increased 
impact and outturn investment amounts. While it is required to move into riskier 
projects, the EIB continues to be soothed by EU guarantees for prudently 
implementing such requested activities. As riskier loans consume larger parts of 
capitalisation , the 2012 capital increase and the 2020 capital replenishment have 
bolstered the effectiveness and resilience  of the EIB’s value capture element. 
Conversely, if these riskier loans are provided to successful investment schemes, they 
offer high returns; the EIB has therefore turned from a “non-profit-making” (EIB, 
1988:1) to a “non-profit-maximising” (EIB, 2011:41) organisation.  
To improve the leverage of the combined EU budget and EIB resources, the bank's 
2010 business model institutionalised a three-pillar activity in its strategic choices 
element, namely lending, blending and advising. This three-pillar structure has 
allowed the EIB not only to develop multi-foci activity but also to devise and test, in 
parallel and under one roof, five different types of business and banking: a) wholesale 
banking for SME financing via partner banks; b) development banking for financing 
outside the Union; c) for-profit banking for risk-taking and -sharing operations; d) 
policy banking for EU priority projects’ financing; and e) banking for advisory services. 
With these five different banking lines under one roof, the EIB enjoys full flexibility for 
its resource and cost allocation, able to pursue the most promising activity at any 
given time against the backdrop of ever-changing political, economic and market 
conditions. In the turbulent economic environment characterised by challenges, such 
as the globalization of the supply and demand sides of the real and the financial 
economies, climate change, and the economic crisis, the EIB’s 2010 business model 
has proved itself robust, well crafted, pertinent and sufficient for the bank to not only 
survive but thrive in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, as shown in this 
analysis and as demonstrated in EIB’s results. The EIB has consequently maintained 
its relevance by unceasingly supporting the ever-changing EU policies when it is called 
to succour, while being supported in this by the same political masters who demand 
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its contribution. While upholding its support for regional development as well as 
economic and social cohesion in the EU,  the EIB’s activity has been shifting to a new 
priority of anti-crisis boosting economic activity, including human capital 
development, innovation, competitiveness and SMEs , as well as climate change 
mitigation . At the end of 2019, climate change mitigation was touted as the EIB’s 
prime future priority when it pivoted to become the first international climate bank in 
support of the European Green Deal. In 2020, its new tasks will include supporting 
post-pandemic economic recovery and InvestEU, which constitute a challenge for 
EIB’s activity consistency in its endeavours to fulfil different mandates, of which some 
have contradictory objectives. Further research on EIB’s 2020 business model could 
shed light on how the EIB will align with these activities.   
Conclusion  
Since its establishment, the EIB has grown into a prominent EU institution with global 
clout. Its development and importance in European policy implementation, as well as 
its formation (Liebe & Howarth, 2019; Mertens & Thiemann, 2019) have accelerated in 
the last ten years. During this period, the EIB has been called to bolster the European 
economy during the global crisis by acting in a countercyclical mode and to support 
its recovery thereafter. To gain increased leverage, its activity has soared in volume, 
enlarging its sector reach, expanding into advisory services and diversifying 
qualitatively to cater to higher-risk projects. The EIB’s business model has proven 
itself flexible, allowing inorganic and organic growth, while remaining solid in a 
turbulent economic environment. This is mainly due to the EIB’s institutional nature 
and, in particular, to its strong shareholder support, its affinity with the Commission 
and the ECB and its pairing with peers and the banking sector. The EIB’s institutional 
nature allows the bank to adapt its activity to EU calls, while its bank side is retrofitted 
by the EU to alleviate possible risks. Although there are changes in EIB’s post-Brexit 
statute in 2020, foreseeing, “along with the financial measures, a number of 
governance changes are planned” (EIB 2019b, p. 4), the above schema is expected to 
extend into the future. InvestEU, the Green Deal and the EU’s response to the 
pandemic aim to deepen the blending of resources and the ties between the EIB and 
its sister institution, the Commission, in a “concept of an integrated partnership,” as 
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Figure 1 The European Investment Bank 1999 business model 
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Figure 2 The European Investment Bank 2010 business model  
 
Source: Author’s illustration  
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